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THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION OF BILLS OF
ATTAINDER: A WANING GUARANTY
OF JUDICIAL TRIAL
"There is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated
from the legislative and executive powers."
- Montesquieu, quoted in
TiE FEDERALIST, No. 78
at 521 (Heritage ed. 1945)
TEE United States Constitution denies both Congress and the state legis-
latures the power to pass bills of attainder.' The elements necessary to con-
stitute a particular piece of legislation a bill of attainder are obscure. The
deceptively simple definition of Cummings v. Missouri,2 the leading case,-
"a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial",,-has
proved difficult of application. The case law is replete with split and irrecon-
cilable decisions, largely revolving about the meaning of "punishment." 4 More-
over, recent opinions tend to brush off a bill of attainder argument with only
the most superficial discussion of precedent.5
1. U.S. CONST. Art. I, §§ 9, 10. For background, see 1 WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 733-5 (1910).
Parliament and the American colonial legislatures had frequently visited punishment
upon individuals without judicial trial. See, generally, I COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LimITA-
TioNS 536 (8th ed. 1927); 2 STORY, COMMENTAIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1344 (5th
ed., Bigelow, 1891) ; Pound, Justice According to Law 11, 14 COL. L. Rv. 1, 1-12 (1914);
Thompson, Anti-Loyalist Legislation During the Americaw Revolution, 3 ILL. L. REV.
81, 147 (1908) ; Annotation, 90 L. ED. 1267, 1268-9 (1946).
2. 4 Wall. 277 (U.S. 1867).
3. Id. at 323. It goes without saying that there must be an act of the legislature.
Yet the charge of bill of attainder has been leveled, unsuccessfully, against even a court's
refusal to admit evidence, United States v. Gosciniak, 142 F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1944);
regulations promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission, American Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); and revocation of a
passport, Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
4. Compare Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), with Cummings
v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (U.S. 1867) ; Ex parte Hunter, 2 W. Va. 122 (1867), with Eix
parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U.S. 1867); Randolph v. Good, 3 W. Va. 551 (1869), witl
Green v. Shumway, 39 N.Y. 418 (1868).
5. Since United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), courts have tended to treat as
trivial an objection that a statute is a bill of attainder. In American Communications
Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), the 31-page Court opinion devotes only two
paragraphs near the very end to this question. In Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341
U.S. 716 (1951), the Court gives it three paragraphs. In several other recent decisions
where the bill of attainder question would appear relevant, the Supreme Court has not
even mentioned it. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) ; Adler v. Board of Edu-
cation, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
The lower federal courts and the state courts usually dismiss the objection with only
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION
The prohibition of bills of attainder is one of several constitutional pro-
visions aimed at maintaining the separation of governmental powers 0 By
barring legislatures from usurpation of judicial functions," the prohibition
was intended to provide a "bulwark [to guard] personal security and private
rights" from "the fluctuating policy which has directed public councils."s
Courts have pointed out that bills of attainder are usually products of "emer-
gencies" when "necessity" is said to render existing laws and judicial trial
inadequate to punish past delinquencies and to preserve community security."
Drumhead justice dispensed by legislatures in such an atmosphere obviously
lacks "any of the forms or safeguards of [judicial] trial." 1°
METHODS OF IDENTIFY-ING ViCTIMS
It is well established that, in order to qualify as a bill of attainder, a statute
must apply either to named individuals or to an easily ascertainable group."
Parliamentary and colonial bills of attainder usually designated their victims
by name 12 or description.13 But the reported cases reveal that, since the
adoption of the Constitution, an American legislature has only once been in-
a sentence or two. E.g., Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948); Na-
tional Maritime Union of America v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C.), aff'd ter
curiam on other gronds, 334 U.S. 854 (1948) ; Shub v. Simpson, 196 id. 177, 76 A2d
332, appeal dismissed as inwot, 340 U.S. 881 (1950); Thorp v. Board of Trustees, 6 N.J.
498, 79 A.2d 462 (1951) ; Huntamer v. Coe, 40 Wash. 2d 767, 246 P2d 419 (1952).
6. See, generally, Wormuth, Legislative Disqualifications as Bills of Attai:dcr, 4
VAND. L. REV. 603, 603-05 (1951.).
7. See Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 336, 3S9 (U.S. 1793) ; Burkett v. McCarty, 73 Ky.
758, 760 (1866) ; Green v. Shumway, 39 N.Y. 418, 421 (1868) ; 2 STony, Co.n ri;TARms
ox THE Co sTiruioN § 1344 (5th ed., Bigelov, 1891).
8. THE FEDmaLIST, No. 44 (Madison) at 299 (Heritage ed. 1945).
9. See Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13, 16 (1862) ; Green v. Shumvay, 39 N.Y. 418, 422,
425 (1868); 2 STORY, CO.'MNTARr-S ON THE C. NSTTUTION' § 1344 (5th ed., Bigelow,
1891).
On this very reasoning, some judges have made a point of criticizing the leading cases,
Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (U.S. 1867), and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333
(U.S. 1867), as bad law. See, e.g., Green v. Shumvway, 39 N.Y. 418, 433 (1Q63) (dis-
senting opinion).
For an extreme example of a Philippic against those who dare to challenge "patriotic"
legislation as a bill of attainder, see Dworken v. Board of Education, 57 Ohio Law Ab-
stract 449, 456-60, 94 N.E.2d 18, 22-25 (C.P. 1950).
10. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 323 (U.S. 1867). Also, see Ogden v. Saun-
ders, 12 Wheat. 213, 266, 2S6 (U.S. 1827) ; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall 386, 3S9 (U.S. 1793) ;
Norris v. Doniphan, 4 Afetc. 385, 427 (Ky. 1863) ; People v. Hayes, 140 N.Y. 484, 490,
35 N.E. 951, 952 (1894) ; Pound, supra note 1, at 8-9.
11. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946).
12. E.g., 17 CAP- II, c. 5 (1665); and statutes involved in Clarendon's Case, 6 How.
St Tr. 291 (1667); Cooper v. Telfair, 4 DalU. 14 (U.S. 100); Thompzuon v. Carr, 5
N.H. 510 (1831) ; Respublica v. Gordon, 1 Dall. 232 (Pa. 1788).
13. E.g., 28 HEN. VIII, c. 18 (1536).
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discreet enough to name its victims specifically.14 Similarly, statutes describ-
ing the individuals to be punished, so that their identity is as obvious as if
they had been named, have been rare."0
The overwhelming number of bills of attainder in the United States have
selected their victims by means of expurgatory oath.10 The legislature re-
quires an individual to forswear commission of specified acts before he is
allowed to enjoy certain rights and privileges.' 7 An easily identifiable group,
namely, those who cannot truthfully take the oath, are thereby deprived of
those rights and privileges. In the companion Civil War cases of Cummings
v. Missouri s and Ex parle Garland,'0 the United States Supreme Court,
five to four, invalidated as bills of attainder legislative acts which singled out
their victims by such expurgatory oaths. The majority pointed out that the
constitutional prohibition would be a "vain and futile proceeding" if it could
be avoided simply by replacing names or descriptions with some slightly less
direct method of identification. 20 This principle has never since been seriously
challenged.21
However, statutes applying to specific individuals or groups, without more,
are not bills of attainder.
22
14. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
15. ip re Yung Sing Hee, 36 Fed. 437 (C.C.D. Ore. 1888) ; Jones v. Slick, 56 So.2d
459 (Fla. 1952); Opinion to the House of Representatives, 96 A.2d 623 (R.I. 1953);
McFarland v. American Sugar Refining, 241 U.S. 79, 85 (1916) semble.
16. Out of 22 final decisions clearly holding that statutes violate the constitutional
prohibition of bills of attainder, 16 involved expurgatory oaths.
The distinction between the ordinary oath of office and expurgatory oaths should be
noted. "The original, and as yet the principal, object of official oaths is to require from
the person about to enter upon the discharge of the duties of a public trust a guaranty
that he will be conscientious in the discharge of such duties and faithful to the public
obligations he is about to assume." Commonwealth v. Jones, 73 Ky. 725, 736 (1874).
17. See, e.g., oaths in Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 280-1 (U.S. 1867), and
Ex pare Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 334-5 (U.S. 1867).
18. 4 Wall. 277 (U.S. 1867).
19. 4 Wall. 333 (U.S. 1867).
20. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325 (U.S. 1867). Also, see Matter of Dor-
sey, 7 Porter 293, 367 (Ala. 1838) (anti-dueling oath prerequisite to public office).
The Cumnings minority could find no bill of attainder because a statute requiring an
expurgatory oath "leaves the party himself to determine his own guilt or innocence, and
pronounce his own sentence. It is not, then, the act of Congress, but the party interested,
that tries and condemns." Ex parle Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 390 (U.S. 1867).
21. Five years later a majority of eight struck down an expurgatory oath in a one-
sentence memorandum opinion on the authority of Cummings and Garland. Pierce v.
Carskadon, 16 Wall. 234 (U.S. 1872).
22. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 268 (1886) (statute prohibited non-governmental
military organizations without permit) ; Dodez v. United States, 154 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.),
rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Gibson v. United States, 329 U.S. 338 (1946) (Selective
Service Act); Perez v. Board of Police Commissioners, 78 Cal. App. 2d 638, 178 P.2d




Historically, the term "bill of attainder" was restricted to those statutes
which punished their victims by death or exile and corrupted their blood, so
that they could not pass property by inheritance.2 When the sanction was
less severe, as a deprivation of political rights, the act was labeled a bill of
pains and penalties.2 4
It is not necessary that a statute "attaint" its victims for it to violate the
constitutional prohibition of bills of attainder. Various early American bills
of pains and penalties were defended against the charge of unconstitutionality
on the ground that no attaint was involved.25 This argument was rejected by
Cummings and Garland, which held that bills of pains and penalties were also
proscribed and that deprivation of the right to pursue the occupations of priest
and attorney constituted punishment.206
lingo, 69 Cal. App. 466, 231 Pac. 601 (1924) (illegal for convicted criminal to possess
firearms); People v. Casa Co., 35 Cal. App. 194, 169 Pac. 454 (1917) (statute provided
for abatement of bawdy houses); State ex rel. Wilcox v. Ryder, 126 Minn. 95, 147 N.W.
953 (1914) (same); Detroit v. AASER & MCE of A., 332 Mich. 237, 51 N.W.2d 228,
appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. S05 (1952) (statute prohibited public employees from strik-
ing); State v. Traffic Telephone Workers' Federation, 2 N.J. 335, 66 A2d 616 (1949)
(statute required compulsory arbitration of public utility labor disputes); Friedman v.
American Surety Co., 137 Tex. 149, 151 S.W.2d 570 (1941) (statute required empktyers
to contribute to unemployment comjrensation fund); Christie v. Lueth, 265 Wis. 326, 61
N.V.2d 338 (1953) (city council passed resolution directing police chief to file charges
against police officer and Police and Fire Commission to investigate the charges).
If every statute which applied to specific individuals or groups were a bill of attainder,
it would be impossible to pass any criminal or regulatory legislation wvhich applied to any-
thing less than all persons within the jurisdiction.
Moreover, "[t]here is no vested right in individuals to have rules of law remain un-
changed for their benefit" NLRB v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F2d 571, 579 (6th
Cir. 1948), cert. denied sub now. Foreman's Association of America v. Edward G. Budd
Mfg. Co., 335 U.S. 908 (1949) (provision of Taft-Hartley Act removing supervisory em-
ployees from protection of Wagner Act held not bill of attainder).
23. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 323 (U.S. 1867); 2 StoRY, Co ._TARms
oN THaE CoussnuTioN § 1344 (5th ed., Bigelow, 1891).
24. See note 23 supra.
25. This argument has found some judicial support. See, e.g., Ex parle Hunter, 2 W.
Va. 122, 184 (1867) (concurring opinion) ; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 387 (1867)
(dissenting opinion).
26. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 320-2 (U.S. 1867) (priest); x pare Gar-
land, 4 Wall. 333, 377 (U.S. 1867) (attorney) ; accord, Ex parte Law, 15 Fed. Cas. 3, No.
8,126, 35 Ga. 285 (S.D. Ga. 1866) (same) ; In re Baxter, 2 Fed. Cas. 1043, No. 1,113
(C.C.E.D. Tenn. 1866) (same); In re Shorter, 22 Fed. Cas. 16, No. 12,811 (D. Ala.
1865) (same) ; Matter of Dorsey, 7 Porter 294 (Ala. 18) (same) ; State ex rel. Pitt-
man v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570 (1869) (college trustee); State v. Heighland, 41 Mo. 383
(1867) (teacher); Murphy & Glover Test Oath Cases, 41 Mo. 339 (1867) (preacher,
attorney). Contra: Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293 (1863) (attorney) ; State v. GareEche,
36 Mo. 256 (1865) (same); Ex parte Quarrier and Fitzhugh, 4 W. Va. 210 (1870)
(same) ; Ex parte Hunter, 2 W. Va. 122 (1867) (same).
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Privilege v. Punishment
Numerous state court decisions refused to find any punishment where the
sanction imposed was loss of one of the "privileges" of citizenship. 27 Cun-
inings and Garland were distinguished on the ground that they had involved
denial of one's right to earn his living in his chosen vocation.28 Efforts to
use the privilege theory to deprive victims of the capacity to sue and to de-
fend in the courts were halted by the United States Supreme Court in a one-
sentence memorandum opinion reversing a state court on the authority of
Cunnmings and Garland.20 But this was until recently the only bill of attainder
case to bring the privilege theory before the high Court,90 and the absence of
a full opinion made it easy to distinguish away. Consequently, the state courts,
with the notable exception of the New York Court of Appeals,81 almost
universally held that where the victim lost his vote or was denied public
office there was no bill of attainder because loss of a "privilege" was not
punishment.8 2 Recently, two state trial courts reached the same result with
regard to receipt of unemployment compensation.
83
Two United States Supreme Court decisions in the past decade reject the
rationale that deprivation of a privilege cannot be punishment within the
27. See cases cited notes 32-3 in!ra.
28. See, e.g., State v. Neal, 42 Mo. 119, 122-3 (1868) ; Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63,
172-4 (1867). Language supporting this view is found in In re Baxter, 2 Fed. Cas. 1043,
1044, No. 1,118 (C.C.E.D. Tenn. 1866) (same oath as Garland invalidated).
29. Pierce v. Carskadon, 16 Wall. 234 (U.S. 1872); accord, Lynch v. Hoffman, 7
W. Va. 553, 578 (1874); Ross v. Jenkins, 7 W. Va. 284 (1874); Kyle v. Jenkins, 6 W.
Va. 371 (1873) ; cf. Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13 (1862). See also McNealy v. Gregory,
13 Fla. 417 (1870) (state constitutional provision abolishing all claims and judgments
arising out of sales of slaves since 1861 -struck down). But cf. Drehman v. Stifle, 8 Wall.
595 (U.S. 1869) (state constitution provided act done under military authority of United
States was absolute defense to civil action).
30. Had bill of attainder been argued, the issue would have been squarely put in Davis
v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), in which the Court upheld an anti-Mormon oath as a
prerequisite to voting in Idaho.
31. Green v. Shumway, 39 N.Y. 418 (1868) (expurgatory Civil War oath pre-
requisite to vote) ; cf. Commonwealth v. Jones, 73 Ky. 725 (1874) (anti-dueling oath pre-
requisite to public office). See also Matter of Dorsey, 7 Porter 294 (Ala. 1838) (same).
32. E.g., Shepherd v. Grimmett, 3 Idaho 403, 31 Pac. 793 (1892) (voting) ; Wooley
v. Watkins, 2 Idaho 590, 22 Pac. 102 (1889) (same) ; Crampton v. O'Mara, 193 Ind. 551,
139 N.E. 360 (1923), appeal dismissed, 267 U.S. 575 (1925) (public office) ; Anderson v.
Baker, 23 Md. 531 (1865) (voting); Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63 (1867) (same); State
ex rel. Wingate v. Woodson, 41 Mo. 227 (1867) (public office); Randolph v. Good, 3 W.
Va. 551 (1869) (voting) ; cf. Boyd v. Mills, 53 Kan. 594, 37 Pac. 16 (1894) (same).
There are some areas where the legislature has unquestionable authority, as to expel
its own members. French v. Senate, 146 Cal. 604, 80 Pac. 1031 (1905). Cf. Gray v. Mc-
Lendon, 134 Ga. 224, 67 S.E. 859 (1910) (legislative removal of state railroad commis-
sioner upheld).
33. State v. Hamilton, 92 Ohio App. 285, 110 N.E.2d 37 (1951); Dworken v. Col-
lopy, 56 Ohio Law Abstract 513, 91 N.E.2d 564 (C.P. 1950). See also National Maritime
Union v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1948), aff'd per curian on other grounds, 334
[Vol. 63: 844
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definition of bills of attainder.34 In Uvited States v. Lovett,3 the sanctuary
of the privilege doctrine, government employment, collapsed. A rider on an
appropriations bill prohibited payment of further compensation to three named
federal employees. 36 The Court interpreted this as a "permanent proscription
from any opportunity to serve the Government [which] is punishment... of
a most severe type."37 American Comunications Association v. Doteds ^ s
concerned a provision of the Taft-Hartley Act requiring union officials to
execute a loyalty oath and a non-Communist affidavit.30 If they failed to do
so, their unions were denied access to the National Labor Relations Board.4 0
Though refusing to find a bill of attainder on other grounds, the Court granted
that denial of access to the NLRB could constitute punishment.4
U.S. 854 (1948) (same statute as in American Communications Association -. Douds, 339
U.S. 382 (1950), see text at notes 55-6 infra).
The ultimate in reasoning is achieved in the Dworken case. "It is simply intended
that persons disloyal to our government may not participate in its bounty. It is calculated
to avoid the danger of having the hand that offers food, bitten by the recipient thereof."
Dworken v. Collopy, 56 Ohio La, Abstract 513, 524, 91 N.E2d 564, 572 (C.P. 1950).
34. This accords with the principle that the state cannot impose arbitrary and un-
constitutional limitations on the exercise of a privilege. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 1,3, 192 (1952) (government employment); United Public Works v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75, 100 (1947) (same).
35. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
36. Emergency Appropriation Act of 1943, § 304, 57 STAT. 450 (1943). A special
House committee had conducted an investigation and concluded that Lovett, Watson, and
Dodd were disloyal. H.R. REP. No. 448, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). The history of the
bill is traced in the court opinion. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 303-313 (1946).
A more detailed account appears in Schuman, 'Bill of Atlafi:dcr' In the Scm'N:ly-Eighth
Congress, 37 Azm. POL Sci. REv. 819 (1943).
It is not to be inferred that the Court considered the legislative history pertinent to
the issue whether the rider fitted the definition of bill of attainder. Rather the majority
used this information merely to determine whether Congress meant only to force Lovett,
Dodd, and Watson to sue for their compensation, as the Court of Claims majority had
held, Lovett v. United States, 104 Ct. Cl. 557, 584, 66 F. Supp. 142, 147-8 (1945), and
Justices Frankfurter and Reed, concurring, agreed, United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303,
330 (1946), or whether Congress intended to bar the three from federal employment, as
the Supreme Court majority held, id. at 313-14.
37. Id. at 316. Cf. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd withorut
oph.ion by an eqvall, divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (holding 3-year bar from
Government service "punishment" which violates Sixth Amendment when imposed with-
out judicial trial). See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 13, 190-1 (1952); Lovett v.
United States, 104 Ct. Cl. 557, 587, 66 F. Supp. 142, 149 (1945) (concurring opinion).
But see Detroit v. AASER & M.NCE of A., 332 Mich. 237, 247, 51 N.W.2d 22, 232 (1952).
38. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
39. § 9(h), 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (Supp. 1952).
40. Ibid.
41. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 3S9-90 (1950).
Thus it seems clear that the denial of any right or privilege can be a sufficient depri-
vation to constitute punishment. This should have been obvious from Cummings. "The
deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment. ...
Cummings v. Missouri, 4 WalL 277, 320 (1867). And "rights" were defined broadly
19541
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Qualification v. Punishment
In its initial encounter with bills of attainder, the United States Supreme
Court in Cummings distinguished punishment from failure to meet legitimate
qualifications. The Court stated, "[Q]ualifications relate to the fitness or
capacity of the party for a particular pursuit or profession. ' 42 Under attack
was a provision of the Missouri Constitution requiring almost everyone who
desired to assume a position of any importance in public or private life to
disavow a wide variety of acts ranging from active support of to sympathy
with the Confederacy. 43 The Court held that these deprivations constituted
punishment.44
Attainable Qualifications and Avoidable Disqualifications. Dent v. West
Virginia 45 established the principle that a law setting up attainable qualifi-
cations, standards which everyone has at least a theoretical opportunity to
meet, is not a bill of attainder. In that decision, the United States Supreme
Court upheld a statute requiring physicians to obtain a license in order to
practice.46 To qualify for a license, an applicant needed a diploma from a
recognized medical school, ten years' experience in practice, or a passing
enough to include what other courts have called "privileges." "The theory upon which
our political institutions rest is, that all men have certain inalienable rights-that among
these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; and that in the pursuit of happiness
all avocations, all honors, all positions, are alike open to every one. . . ." Id. at 321.
Where nothing happens, there is, of course, no punishment and no bill of attainder.
Dworken v. Board of Education, 57 Ohio Law Abstract 449, 94 N.E.2d 18 (C.P. 1950),
aff'd, 63 Ohio Law Abstract 10, 108 N.E.2d 103 (Ct. App.), appeal dismnissed, 156
Ohio St. 346, 102 N.E.2d 253 (1951) (loyalty oath for teachers, but no implementation).
Likewise, where a matter is merely preliminary to an adjudication, there is no punish-
ment. In re De Giacomo, 7 Fed. Cas. 366, No. 3,747 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1874) (extradition);
Mosher v. Bay Circuit Judge, 108 Mich. 503, 66 N.W. 384 (1896) (statute authorized
commencement of suit by attachment before maturity of debt) ; Christie v. Lueth, 265 Wis.
326, 61 N.W.2d 338 (1953) (city council passed resolution directing police chief to file
charges against a police officer and Police and Fire Commission to investigate the
charges).
42. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 319 (U.S. 1867).
43. Id. at 279-81.
44. Id. at 320. In dictum, the majority gratuitously observed that many (but not all)
of the acts which Cummings was required to deny bore "no possible relation to [his] fit-
ness" for the priesthood. Id. at 319. However, the Court did not rest its decision on
relevancy. The oath "was required in order to reach the person, not the calling. It was
exacted not from any notion that the several acts designated indicated unfitness for the
callings, but because it was thought that the several acts deserved punishment. . . ." Id.
at 320. And in the companion case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U.S. 1867), the
Court stated, "The question ...is not to the power of Congress to prescribe qualifica-
tions [for attorneys], but whether that power has been exercised as a means for the in-
fliction of punishment.. . ." Id. at 379-80.
It could scarcely be contended that Congress could not reasonably decide that past
loyalty to the Union was relevant to the qualifications of an officer of the federal courts.
Cf. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
45. 129 U.S. 1.14 (1889).
46. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
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score on a special examination.47 On the attainable qualifications rationale,
courts have always upheld, against the charge of bill of attainder, statutes set-
ting standards of education and of skill for various occupations -8 or requir-
ing payment of fees.49
In the Lovett case, Justice Frankfurter, concurring, sketched out a theory
that a prospective statute could not be a bill of attainder because it did not
"punish" past conduct.50 This followed from his requirements that, to be a
bill of attainder, a statute must specify the offense and contain a declaration
of guilt.51 Obviously, a prospective statute can contain neither. Moreover,
Justice Frankfurter was willing to admit that such formal requisites could
easily be evaded as to past acts.52 This view diametrically opposes that of the
Court in Cummings: "If the inhibition [on bills of attainder] can be evaded
by the form of the enactment, its insertion in the fundamental law was a vain
and futile proceeding." 3
Nevertheless, in the Douds case,'; the majority of the Supreme Court
adopted the view that a prospective statute could not be a bill of attainder. See-
47. Id. at 115-17.
48. Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505 (1903) (board to e-amine qualifications of, and
to license, physicians) ; Butcher v. Maybury, 8 F.2d 155 (W.D. Wash. 1925) (educational
requirements for drugless healers) ; France v. State, 57 Ohio St. 1, 47 N.E. 1041 (197)
(same as Dent); Davis v. Beeler, 185 Tenn. 638, 207 S.W.Zd 343 (1947), appeal dis-
missed, 333 U.S. 859 (1948) (stiffer qualifications for naturopaths) ; ef. Davis v. Savan-
nah, 147 Ga. 605, 95 S.E. 6 (1918) (sanitary regulation of milk production).
49. In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296, 108 P.2d 858 (1940) (attorneys required to pay bar asso-
ciation dues); Kelly v. State Bar of Oklahoma, 148 Okla. 282, 293 Pac. 623 (1931)
(same) ; cf. Jones v. Ellis, 182 Ga. 3S0, 185 S.E. 510 (1936) (increase in bond rcquired of
school district secretary-treasurer); Losier v. Sherman, 157 Kan. 153, 138 P.2d 272
(1943) (statute specified conditions on which judgment creditor could garnish debtors
earnings).
50. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 323 (1946) (concurring opinion).
Justice Frankfurter reasoned that a statute could not be a bill of attainder unless it was
also an ex post facto law. Ibid. This ignores the full implicattns of the requirement of
a judicial trial for a statute to avoid constituting a bill of attainder. See pages 857-61
infra.
51. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 322-3 (1946).
52. "Congress need merely omit its ground of condemnation and legislate the penalty!
But," Justice Frankfurter added, "the prohibition against a 'Bill of Attainder' is only
one of the safeguards of liberty in the arsenal of the Constitution. There are other pro-
visions in the Constitution, specific and comprehensive, effectively designed to assure the
liberties of our citizens." Id. at 326. Cf. Wolf v. Colorado, 333 U.S. 25, 31-2 (1949).
These "other provisions" can be none other than the due process and judicial rights
aimirdments of the Constitution. Hence, Justice Frankfurter would permit what were
intended as additional safeguards to operate in derogation of the bill of attainder pro-
hibitions of the original document. Moreover, the protection of the judicial rights amend-
ments comes into play only once one gets inside the judicial arena. See te.\t at notes 124-5
infra.
53. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325 (U.S. 1867).
54. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 332 (1950) (5-1 decision).
Cf. Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951) (loyalty oath required of can-
didates for public office in Maryland upheld without mention of bill of attainder).
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tion 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act requires union officers to execute a non-
Communist affidavit and loyalty oath in order that their unions may have
access to the NLRB.55 The oath inquires only into present membership and
loyalty.5 Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the majority in upholding the
statute, distinguished this oath from those concerning past conduct which had
been invalidated in Cummings and Garland.57 Moreover, he was unable to
discern how there could be punishment when the impact of the statute could
be avoided "by a voluntary alteration of loyalties" (and membership).ri The
majority found a legitimate public interest in the prevention of political strikes
in interstate commerce. 59 They could see nothing wrong with the expurgatory
oath as a device for determining which union leaders would be most likely
to call such strikes.60
55. 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (Supp. 1952).
56. Ibid.
57. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 413 (1950); accord,
Albertson v. Millard, 106 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Mich. 1952), vacated and remanded, 345
U.S. 242 (1953) (Michigan's Trucks Act, inter alia, banned Communist Party from
ballot) ; Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 76 A.2d 332, appeal dismissed as moot, 340 U.S.
881 (1950) (non-subversive affidavit prerequisite to candidacy for public office) ; Huntamer
v. Coe, 40 Wash. 2d 767, 246 P.2d 489 (1952) (same); Thorp v. Board of Trustees, 6
N.J. 498, 79 A.2d 462 (1951) (loyalty oath for teachers).
Support for this view is found in dicta in the seriatim majority and minority opinions
of Ogden v. Saunders, 12-Wheat. 213, 266, 303, 329, 336 (U.S. 1827).
58. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 414 (1950). This seems
to be diametrically opposed to the following language from Cummings: "These bills may
inflict punishment absolutely, or may inflict it conditionally." Cummings v. Missouri, 4
Wall. 277, 324 (U.S. 1867). The reference was to one type of parliamentary bill of at-
tainder which imposed punishment on those members of a described group who failed to
surrender themselves by a given date to stand trial. E.g., Clarendon's Case, 6 How. St.
Tr. 291 (1667). On the basis of this historical background, an old Kentucky decision
invalidated a prospective statute providing for forfeiture of lands for failure to occupy
and to cultivate them. Doe ex dern. Gaines v. Buford, 1 Dana 481 (Ky. 1833).
Moreover, the mere fact that a statute is prospective does not mean that it is avoid-
able. Opinion to the House of Representatives, 96 A.2d 623 (R.I. 1953), struck down as
a bill of attainder a statute disqualifying relatives of city officials from holding appointive
city offices. See also Jones v. Slick, 56 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1952), holding a city ordinance
providing for the fine and/or imprisonment of local officials upon conviction for offenses
by a two-thirds vote of the city council to be a bill of attainder.
59. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 390-1 (1950). Also,
see Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 267 (7th Cir. 1949) (same statutory pro-
vision).
60. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 408-09 (1950). The
resemblance to the defense given by the Garland dissenters should be noted. "The history
of the time when this statute was passed-the darkest hour of our great struggle-the
necessity for its existence, the humane character of the President who signed the bill,
and the face of the law itself, all show that it was purely a qualification; exacted in self-
defense, of all who took part in administering the government in any of its departments,
and that it was not passed for the purpose of inflicting punishment, however merited, for
past offenses." E parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 396 (U.S. 1867).
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The deprivation in Douds stemmed not from a failure to meet an "attain-
able qualification" but from a failure to avoid an "avoidable disqualification."
In cases like Dent,61 an individual qualifies by adding something to his exist-
ing attributes: by obtaining a diploma from a recognized medical school, by
passing an examination, by paying a fee.02 Under section 9(h) of the Taft-
Hartley Act,63 an easily ascertainable group determined by expurgatory oath,
namely, Communist union officials, must surrender their posts if their unions
are to have access to the NLRB. But this disqualification can be escaped if
they will only recant and renounce their affiliation with the Communist
Party.64 Thus they can "qualify," not by adding to, but by divesting them-
selves of one of, their existing attributes.
Unavoidable Disqualifications Based on Past Acts. just as some courts
tended to uphold any prospective statute on the theory that it merely estab-
lished "qualifications,"0 35 so other courts baldly stated that any retrospective
statute imposed "disqualifications," which made it a bill of attainder" Since
the criteria were based on past conduct, some existing persons would find it
impossible to qualify. 7 These individuals were said to be conclusively "dis-
qualified."63 The statute imposed "punishment" on them and was therefore
a bill of attainder.6 9
The theory that a statute imposing unavoidable disqualifications was neces-
sarily a bill of attainder collapsed with Hawker v. New York. 0 In that case,
the United States Supreme Court upheld, six to three, a statute disqualifying
convicted felons from the practice of medicine, as applied to an abortionist
convicted prior to the passage of the statute.7 ' The Court reasoned that a
state might rightfully require good character of those who would practice
medicine and that it could reasonably determine that conviction of a felony
was conclusive evidence of bad character. - A vigorous dissent, accepting the
qualification-disqualification dichotomy, rested on the ground that Hawker
could not undo the past act and qualify.7 3
61. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (18S9), discussed in text at notes 45-7
-supra.
62. See cases cited in notes 48 and 49 supra.
63. See text at notes 55-6 spra.
64. See text at note 58 supra.
65. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Matter of
Dorsey, 7 Porter 294, 359 (Ala. 1838).
66. Matter of Dorsey, 7 Porter 294, 359 (Ala. 1838). See Hawker v. New York,
170 U.S. 189, 203-04 (1898) (dissenting opinion). Language in Cumnings appears to sup-
port this view. "Any deprivation or suspension of any of these rights for past conduct is
punishment, and can be in no otherwise defined." Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277,
322 (U.S. 1S67).
67. See note 66 supra.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
71. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 189-90 (1898).
72. Id. at 196.
73. Id. at 200-05.
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Since Hawker did not overrule Cummings and Garland, its distinguishing
features are significant. The statutes invalidated by Cummings and Garland
operated on existing individuals who, because of past acts, could not truth-
fully take an expurgatory oath.74 By contrast, the statute upheld in Hawker
applied to all those who had been and would in the future be convicted of
felonies by courts.7 5 Past acts as such were irrelevant; significance was at-
tached only to judicial convictions.70
An expurgatory oath retrospective on its face came before the Supreme
Court in Garner v. Board of Public Works. 77 In 1941 the California legis-
lature amended the City Charter of Los Angeles to bar from city offices and
jobs persons who advocated subversive views or were associated with sub-
versive organizations. 7 Pursuant to the amendment, Los Angeles in 1948
passed an ordinance requiring all city employees to make oath that they had
not advocated subversive views or been associated with any subversive organi-
zation since 1943, five years prior to enactment of the ordinance.70
A five-judge majority upheld the oath in spite of its retrospective features
by relating it back to the charter amendment.80 "The activity covered by the
74. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325 (1867) ; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333,
377 (1867).
75. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
76. "[If the legislature] may make a violation of criminal law a test of bad character,
what more conclusive evidence of the fact of such violation can there be than a conviction
duly had in one of the courts of the state? The conviction is, as between the state and
the defendant, an adjudication of fact." Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898).
77. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
78. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 717-18 (1951). The Charter
amendment itself purported to bar those who had engaged in the proscribed conduct for
the five previous years as well. Ibid. The Court assumed, however, that the amendment
would be applied only to conduct subsequent to its adoption. Id. at 720.
79. Id. at 718-19. The ordinance also required employees to file an affidavit as to
membership in the Communist Party. Id. at 719. The affidavit was upheld, seven to two,
on the ground that it was merely for informational purposes. Id. at 720, 725-6, 730.
Justice Douglas, dissenting, considered the affidavit merely a mechanism in enforcing the
ordinance, which he considered a bill of attainder. Id. at 732.
80. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) ; accord, Hirschman v.
Los Angeles County, 231 P.2d 140 (Cal. App. 1951), aff'd on other grounds, 39 Cal. 2d
698, 249 P.2d 287 (1952) (same oath and affidavit but for county instead of city); cf.
Board of Regents v. Updegraff, 205 Okla. 301, 237 P.2d 131 (1951), rev'd sub not.
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
In Garner, Justice Burton, dissenting, refused to accept the majority's relation back
doctrine. 341 U.S. 716, 729 (1951). Justice Douglas, dissenting, stressed the fact that
the oath inquired into past conduct, id. at 735-6, but did not rest on this ground. Id. at
733-6.
The use of precedent by the Garner majority is, to say the least, interesting. Except
for Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951), none of the cases cited as sup-
port involved oaths; and Gerende, a one-paragraph per curiam opinion, did not even
mention bills of attainder. Therefore the Court must have been relying sub silenlio on
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). But both Gerende and
Douds involved "avoidable disqualifications," see text at notes 61-4 supra; the city ordi-
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oath had been proscribed by the Charter in the same terms, for the same
purpose, and to the same effect over seven years before, and two years prior
to the period embraced in the oath." 8' The majority refused to find a bill of
attainder, holding that the charter and ordinance merely "declare general and
prospectively operative standards of qualification and eligibility for public em-
plovmient."8' - Apparently to mitigate the retrospective aspects of the oath.
however, the Court injected scienter.8 3 A city employee could not be fired
unless he kneaw (whether or not he agreed wvith) the objectives of subversive
organizations he joined.8 4
The Present State of the Law. Since Lovett, 5 the United States Supreme
Court has consistently narrowed the scope of the bill of attainder prohibition.
In Douds,8 6 the Court upheld a statute requiring an expurgatory oath with
regard to present conduct. This was approved because no one vas conclusive-
ly disqualified on the basis of past conduct.8 7 Whatever disqualification there
was could be avoided "by a voluntary alteration of loyalties. '" In Garner,8 3
the Court upheld an ordinance requiring an expurgatory oath concerning con-
duct prior to the oath."° Here there was no possibility of avoidance and past
acts did disqualify an individual.' Nonetheless, the majority approved this
oath because a prior legislative act had prohibited the same conduct into which
the oath inquired on the part of the same people who were required to take
the oath. 2 The oath was considered a mere mechanism for imposing the
"general and prospectively operative standards of qualification" established
by the earlier statute. 3
The Supreme Court has imposed some limitations on disqualifications based
on past conduct because of other constitutional provisions. In Garner, the
nance in Garner reached back five years into the past. The only cawv cited in supprt
involving past acts was Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (189,3, and hanwhcr rested
not on past acts elicited by oath but on judicial conviction of a fekiy, see nt,te 7hi supra.
81. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 721 (1951).
82. Id. at 723.
83. Id. at 723-4. See also Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) ; Gerende v.
Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
There was no mention of scienter as to present membership in American Cmmnuni-
cations Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). Thus, apparently, scienltr is required only
as to past membership. But cf. Gerende, supra.
84. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 723-4 (1951).
85. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
86. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 32 (1950).
87. Id. at 413.
88. Id. at 414.
89. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
90. See text at note 79 supra.
91. The scienter limitation imposed by the Court, see text at notes 83-4 smpra, does
not make this any less so. See also note 126 infra.
92. See text at notes 78 and 81 sn pro.
93. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 721, 723 (1951).
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Court did require scienter on the part of the oath-taker, but on the rationale
that the Due Process Clause required it.04 In Wienzan v. Updegraif,95 the
Court invalidated on due process grounds an almost exact duplicate of the
Garner oath, which also reached back five years into the past ;0 here the court
was foreclosed from reading scienter into the oath.9 7 Bill of attainder was
argued but is not even mentioned in the Court opinion. 8 And in Wieman
there was no previous legislation to which the oath could be related back. 0
IVieman left unanswered the question whether the present Supreme Court
would hold that an oath inquiring into past conduct not previously forbidden
to the same class of people by prior legislation violates the bill of attainder
prohibition. In such a case, there would be no factual grounds left on which
to distinguish Cummings and Garland as the Court has done thus far.
However, the present Supreme Court appears ready to permit its expand-
ing qualification doctrine to swallow up Cummings and Garland completely.
Under the Douds-Garner rationale, the only real question for bill of attainder
purposes is whether, under the circumstances, the legislature could reasonably
find the conduct inquired into relevant to the deprivations imposed. 100 The
Court appears to consider the mode of inquiry irrelevant. 01 If the conduct
itself is relevant, the Court reasons, the statute establishes qualifications in-
stead of imposing punishment. 0 2 Since the question of relevancy is primarily
legislative, something the Cummings-Garland majority conceded, 0 3 only the
94. Id. at 723-4 (1951).
95. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
96. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 184-5 (1952). The oath applied to all officers
and employees of the State of Oklahoma.
97. Id. at 191.
98. Id. at 185.
99. See id. at 184-5. Moreover, in its discussion of Garner, id. at 189-90, the lVieina'i
opinion makes no mention of the prior charter amendment.
100. See text at notes 59-60, 82 supra. And, of course, past conduct is relevant. "Past
conduct may well relate to present fitness; past loyalty may have a reasonable relation-
ship to present and future trust. Both are commonly inquired into in determining fitness
for both high and low positions in private industry and are not less relevant in public
employment." Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341. U.S. 716, 720 (1951).
101. In neither American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) nor
Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) does the Court so much as in-
timate that the use of an expurgatory oath might have something to do with whether a
statute is a bill of attainder. The only discussion of oaths as such is with regard to
religious test oaths and oaths of office. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382, 414-15 (1950). Yet the expurgatory oath question was the basic issue in Cum-
mings and Garland. Compare the majority in Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 324-5
(U.S. 1867), with the dissent in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 389-90 (U.S. 1867).
102. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 722-3 (1951).
103. "The legislature may undoubtedly prescribe qualifications for the office, to which
he must conform, as it may, where it has exclusive jurisdiction, prescribe qualifications




aberrational statute specifically naming its victims would be struck down under
this standard.104
THE FORGOTTEN ELEMENT: LACK OF JUDIcIAL TRIL%
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which imposes punishment on named
individuals or an easily ascertainable group without judicial triaL105 The
legislative acts involved in Cummings and Garland were invalid not simply
because they imposed punishment, something every criminal statute does, but
because they imposed punishment on an easily ascertainable group without
judicial trial.108
There is no need for trial by courts when the concern is with statutes
establishing strictly attainable qualifications or character standards. Practica-
bility probably requires relegation of such matters to administrative boards.
Courts will traditionally interfere when such boards exceed their powersior
Thus the legislature can require loyalty of government employees without
creating a bill of attainder so long as it does not itself single out, by oath or
otherwise, some individuals or an identifiable group as conclusively disloyal.103
104. See discussion of the Lozvtt case in Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S.
716,723 (1951).
105. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946).
106. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325 (U.S. 1867) ; Ex parke Garland, 4 Wall.
333, 377 (U.S. 1867).
107. See, generally, DAvis, ADmmsTRATivE LAW C. 19 (1951). For a complete dis-
cussion of the extent of judicial review of refusal of the Bar to admit an attorney to
practice, see Brooks v. Laws, 208 F.2d IS (D.C. Cir. 1953).
108. The procedure followed by New York in its Feinberg Law illustrates the mat-
ter further. Subversives are barred from the teaching profession, and memberhip in a
group listed by the State Board of Regents as subversive is prin.a facie evidence of in-
dividual subversiveness.
In Thompson v. Wallin, the Communist Part, alleged that it was being punished by
a bill of attainder. The trial court accepted this argument because the prei'rnde to the
statute mentioned the Communist Party by name. 196 Misc. 6%, 696-7, 93 N.Y.S2d 274,
283-4 (Sup. Ct. 1949). To this the Court of Appeals responded, "Such preamble enacts
nothing, contains no directives and ... is not made a part of the Education Law." 301
N.Y. 476, 493, 95 N.E.2d 806, 814 (1950). The Court of Appeals held that there was no
bill of attainder because an organization threatened with listing is entitled to an adminis-
trative hearing with judicial review. 301 N.Y. 493, 95 N.E.2d at 814, appca! dismissed,
342 U.S. 801 (1951).
Various teachers also sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute. The courts held
no bill of attainder, pointing out that the individual was also entitled to an administrative
hearing with judicial review. Membership in a subversive organization was not conclusive
but only prima facie evidence for disqualifying a teacher as subversive. Under such a
proceeding, punishment is based on individual "guilt" determined on a case to case basis
with due regard to the requirements of due process. Lederman v. Board of Education,
276 App. Div. 527, 96 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 301 N.Y. 476, 95 N.E2d 306 (1950),
aff'd sub norn. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); L'Hommedieu v.
Board of Regents, 276 App. Div. 494, 95 N.Y.S.2d 443 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 301 N.Y. 476,
95 N.E2d 806 (1950). Cf. Weinstock v. Ladisky, 197 Misc. 859, 93 N.Y.S2d SS (Sup.
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Hawker,10 9 the only United States Supreme Court decision prior to Douds
to permit direct legislative imposition of punishment upon an easily ascertain-
able group, rested disqualification on a past judicial conviction. The statute
in Hawker prohibited convicted felons from practicing medicine ;110 in that
case it was applied to an abortionist convicted prior to the passage of the
law.111 Undeniably felons convicted prior to the passage of the law repre-
sented an easily identifiable group. However, the statute relied not on any
past act as such, but on a judicial conviction of a crime serious enough to
support a conclusive presumption that one convicted thereof lacked good
character at a later date."12
This distinction based on the presence or absence of a judicial finding of
guilt is clearly illustrated by several state court decisions in the post-Civil
War period involving denial of the vote to deserters. Conviction of desertion
resulted in loss of citizenship ;113 most states extended the vote only to United
States citizens.114 Various convicted deserters urged that such franchise stat-
utes operated as bills of attainder towards them. The courts made short shrift
of this argument, pointing out the judicial conviction.115 Kentucky, by con-
Ct. 1950) (amendment to union constitution banning subversives and fascists upon hear-
ing held not bill of attainder).
109. Hawker v. New York. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
110. Id. at 190.
111. Id. at 189-90.
1.12. "[I]f the legislature enacts that one who has been convicted of crime shall no
longer engage in the practice of medicine, it is simply applying the doctrine of res
judicata and invoking the conclusive adjudication of the fact that the man has violated
the criminal law, and is presumptively, therefore, a man of such bad character as to
render it unsafe to trust the lives and health of citizens to his care." Id. at 196.
113. Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. 112, 113 (1866).
114. Ibid.
115. Gotcheus v. Matheson, 58 Barb. 152 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1870), rev'd on other
grounds, 61 N.Y. 420 (1875); Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. 112 (1866); cf. Story v. Rives,
68 App. D.C. 325, 97 F.2d 182, cert. denied, 305 U.S. 595 (1938) (statute provided parole
violators required to serve remainder of original sentence) ; Peer v. Skeen, 108 F. Supp.
921 (N.D.W.Va. 1952) (habitual criminal statute); Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582
(1884) (illegal for those convicted of various crimes to vote); People v. Israel, 91 Cal.
App. 2d 773, 206 P.2d 62 (1949) (habitual criminal statute); People v. Lawrence, 390
Ill. 499, 61 N.E.2d 361 (1945) (same) ; Crampton v. O'Mara, 193 Ind. 551, 139 N.E. 360
(1923), appeal dismissed, 267 U.S. 575 (1925) (those convicted of infamous crimes dis.
qualified from public office); State v. Graves. 352 Mo. 1102, 182 S.W.2d 46 (1944)
(statute permitted impeachment of witness by prior conviction) ; Skinner v. State ex rcl.
Williamson, 189 Okla. 235, 115 P.2d 123 (1941), rev'd on other grounds, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (habitual criminal sterilization act); Estate of King, 261 Wis. 266, 52 N.W.2d
885 (1952) (murderer cannot take as surviving joint tenant). But cf. Davis v. Berry,
216 Fed. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), rev'd on other grounds, 242 U.S. 468 (1917) (habitual
criminal statute providing for vasectomy). See also United States v. Distillery, 25 Fed.
Cas. 866, No. 14,965 (D. Del. 1870) (statute provided for forfeiture of premises on
which alcohol manufactured without payment of taxes) ; Department of Social Welfare
v. Gardiner, 94 Cal. App. 2d 431, 210 P.2d 855 (1949) (state could recover double against
estate of deceased recipient of old age pension who failed to reveal property or income
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trast, required a prospective voter to swear that he had not deserted to the
Confederacy as a prerequisite to exercise of his franchise.' 10 The court labeled
the oath process a "mock-trial" and held the statute a bill of attainder." 7
The judicial trial demanded by the bill of attainder prohibition must come
before punishment is imposed. There are circumstances where a bill of at-
tainder results in a different kind of judicial trial which does not satisfy the
constitutional provision. Cummings was one such case; Cummings was tried
for preaching without having taken the required expurgatory oath.118 And
an individual may be prosecuted for falsely taking the oath.110 The issue in
such cases is whether the defendant has attempted to escape the punishment
imposed by the bill of attainder. Such a trial simply determines whether an
individual is a member of the easily ascertainable group which the legislature
has already punished without judicial trial. 20 The punishment in such cases
is wholly apart from the deprivations imposed by the legislature in the bill of
attainder itself.
Douds l and Garner 1' subvert the American judicial process by substi-
tuting an inquisitorial for an accusatorial system of justice. The oath-taker
is barred from the exercise of various rights and privileges whenever he is
in excess of statutory limit); Moore v. Commonwealth, 293 Ky. 55, 16 S.A2d 342
(1943) (statute provided for forfeiture of property used for sale of intoxicating liquors
in dry territory) ; Moffett v. Commerce Trust Co., 354 Mo. 1093, 193 S.W.2d 5S, appcal
dismissed, 329 U.S. 669 (1946) (statute provided for dismissal with treble costs when
three petitions found insufficient) ; State v. Coubal, 243 Wis. 247, 21 NAV.2d 3S1 (1946)
(statute provided for issuance of injunctions prohibiting operation of gambling devices).
116. Burkett v. McCarty, 73 Ky. 758, 759 (1866).
117. "[T]he legislature may rightfully forfeit a citizen's right to vcte as a penalty
for perjury or other crime. But if a citizen be challenged at the polls as disqualiied
by crime, can he be excluded without or before conviction, and who can ctnvict? [His
commission of a crime] is necessarily a judicial question, which can be constitutionally
decided [only] by the judiciary on a full and fair trial on an indictment or a presnt-
ment." Id. at 762.
118. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 316 (U.S. 1267).
119. Section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act, note .6 supra, involved in American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 323 U.S. 303 (1946), expressly sv prvides.
120. Of course, many pieces of criminal and regulatory legislation apply to an identi-
fiable group, so that the only issue in a trial for violation thereof is in effect whether a
person belongs to the group. See note 22 supra. To call such a statute a bill of attainder
would incorporate discredited notions of substantive due process. However, in the un-
likely event that the legislature -passed a statute providing that X, Y, and Z were barred
from government employment upon a judicial finding that they were X, 11, and Z, a
court might well call this a "mock-trial" and therefore a bill of attainder. See te:%t at
note 117 supra. The question in such a case would more properly be one of violation of
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses by creating an unreasonable classification.
See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rcl. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
121, American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) ; see notes 54-SO
supra and accompanying text.
122. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); see notes 77-84 -sutra
and accompanying text
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unable to take the required oath truthfully.123 There is no grand jury indict-
ment, no burden of proof on the state, no privilege against self-incrimination,
no requirement of two witnesses to treasonable acts, no conviction by a petit
jury of one's peers. 124 There is no opportunity for a case by case determina-
tion of the existence of a "clear and present danger" when the proscribed
conduct includes speech and political associations. 125 Moreover, direct imposi-
tion of deprivations by the legislature admits no defense of lack of intent,
coercion, self-defense, insanity, or anything else.120 And in the borderline
case, the victim must decide an issue that should be determined by a court
or by an administrative body.127
When the question is posed in these terms, the Garner theory that a prior
prohibitory statute will validate a subsequent oath inquiring into violations
of that statute 128 stands exposed as the fallacy it is. Otherwise, criminal law
administration could be greatly simplified by the enactment of a statute re-
quiring everyone to make oath periodically that he had not committed various
crimes and summarily visiting the usual punishments on those who could not
truthfully take the oath.
The evils of bills of attainder lie not so much in what is done as in how
it is done, in the usurpation of the judging function by the legislature.129 It
was this separation of the proscribing and guilt-determining functions, accord-
123. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 377 (U.S. 1867).
124. See Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 323 (U.S. 1867) ; In re Shorter, 22
Fed. Cas. 16, 19, No. 12,811 (D. Ala. 1865). This would seem to dispose of Justice
Frankfurter's contention in Lovett, see note 52 supra, that the bill of attainder prohibition
is a mere superfluity since other constitutional provisions offer adequate protection.
125. Compare Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951), quoting Judge
Learned Hand, "[I]n each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' dis-
counted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
the danger," (emphasis added) with American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382 (1950), which upheld the validity of the Taft-Hartley expurgatory oath once
and for all. Since Douds, the only trial an individual can get on the oath is one for
perjury in taking it. And in such a case, the First Amendment is irrelevant.
126. See Doe ex dent. Gaines v. Buford, 1 Dana 481, 492 (Ky. 1833). Disqualifica-
tion on the basis of commission of an act instead of a judicial conviction under the statute
in Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898), would affect the physician who performed
an abortion at gunpoint, a circumstance where acquittal would be foreordained in the
judicial process. The attempted sop of scienter offered by Garner v. Board of Public
Works, 341 U.S. 716, 723-4 (1951), text at note 84 supra, scarcely improves the situation.
Obviously, the physician would know he had committed an abortion.
127. Where the statute involves an expurgatory oath, the victim faces the prospect
of a perjury conviction if he misguesses how a court would decide his case.
128. See text at notes 81-2 szpra.
129. "['T]is an improper mode; because it puts the most essential interests of the
citizen upon a worse footing than we should be willing to tolerate where inferior interests
were concerned; and because ... it substitutes for the established and legal mode of in-
vestigating crimes and inflicting forfeitures, one that is unknown to the Constitution, and
repugnant to the genius of our law." Alexander Hamilton, quoted in Cummings v. Mis-
souri, 4 Wall. 277, 332 (U.S. 1867).
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ing to Madison in The Federalist, that the constitutional prohibition was in-
tended to preserve. 130 It is this same separation of functions that the Supreme
Court ignored in Douds and Garner.'3' The Court justified its finding of
no bill of attainder in those cases by reliance on the relevancy of the conduct
proscribed to the deprivations imposed. 32 But such matters are irrelevant
to a constitutional prohibition which has nothing to do with end results but
concerns itself solely with the means by which punishment is imposed.
CoNcLusIoN
The Cunmings definition of bill of attainder 133 needs to be restated in a
more meaningful form if it is to have any real force in present-day con-
stitutional law. We suggest the following: a legislative act which without
judicial trial deprives named individuals, or groups easily ascertainable by
description or expurgatory oath, of an, right or privilege.
Such a restatement is necessary to prevent legislative usurpation of judicial
functions. Decisions like Douds' 3-1 and Garncr,135 with their reliance on
reasonableness, 3 have reduced the constitutional prohibition on bills of at-
tainder to a supple reed indeed. The provision is no longer a "bulwark in
favor of personal security and private rights" against "the fluctuating policy
[of] public councils"' 37 when that policy is used to justify a finding of no bill
of attainder. If the aim of the prohibition is to allow the imposition of punish-
ment only after a judicial finding of guilt, the legislature cannot be permitted
to decide who is guilty of what in the guise of protecting the public.133 Other-
wise, the fate of every citizen will rest not on the rock of constitutional justice
but on the shifting sands of legislative pleasure.139
130. THE FE~muaIST, No. 44 (Madison) at 299 (Heritage ed. 1945). See ala Wor-
muth, Legislative Disqaalifications as Bills of Attainder, 4 Vwm. L R-v. 693, C94-05
(1951).
131. See Cummings v. Missouri, 4 WalL 277, 323 (U.S. 1067).
132. See text at notes 59 and 82 suipra.
133. "[A] legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial." Cummings
v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 323 (U.S. 1867).
134. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 3,2 (1950).
135. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
136. See text at notes 59 and 82 supra.
137. TaE FEDERAuIST, No. 44 (Madison) at 299 (Heritage ed. 1945).
138. See note 120 supra.
139. "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." TUE FEDZILWSa,
No. 47 (Madison) at 322 (Heritage ed. 1945).
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